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  We ask why, in many circumstances and many environments, decision-makers 
choose to act on a time-regular basis (e.g. adjust every six weeks) or on a state-
regular basis (e.g. set prices ending in a 9), even though such an approach appears 
suboptimal. The paper attributes regular behaviour to adjustment cost heterogeneity. 
We show that, given the cost heterogeneity, the likelihood of adopting regular policies 
depends on the shape of the benefit function: the flatter it is, the more likely, ceteris 
paribus, is regular adjustment. We provide sufficient conditions under which, when 
policymakers differ with respect to the shape of the benefit function (as in Konieczny 
and  Skrzypacz,  2006),  the  frequency  of  adjustments  across  markets  is  negatively 
correlated  with  the  incidence  of  regular  adjustments.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
policymakers differences are due to the level of adjustment costs (as in Dotsey, King 
and Wolman, 1999), then the correlation is positive.  
  To  test  the  model we apply it to optimal  pricing policies. We use a large 
Austrian  data  set,  which  consists  of  the  direct  price  information  collected  by  the 
statistical office and covers 80% of the CPI over eight years. We run cross-sectional 
tests,  regressing  the  proportion  of  attractive  prices  and,  separately,  the  excess 
proportion of price changes  at  the  beginning of a  year and at the beginning  of a 
quarter, on various conditional frequencies of adjustment, inflation and its variability, 
dummies for good types, and other relevant variables. We find that the lower is, in a 
given market, the conditional frequency of price changes, the higher is the incidence 
of time- and state-regular adjustment. 
 
JEL codes: E31, L11, E52, D01 
Keywords: Optimal pricing, attractive prices, menu costs 
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We ask why, in many circumstances and in many environments, policy makers choose to 
act on a regular, rather than a state-dependent (or irregular) basis, even though such approach 
appears suboptimal. Perhaps the best example of regular adjustment, although it is not analyzed 
here, is the recent US monetary policy. Between June 2004 and May 2006, the Federal Reserve 
increased  the  federal  funds  rate  every  six  weeks  (16  times  overall),  each  time  by  a  quarter 
percent.  Further  examples  of  regular  policies  can  be  found  in  economics  (price  and  wage 
adjustment, fiscal policy), management (inventory policy), engineering (machinery refurbishing), 
medicine (scheduling doctor’s visits) etc.  
To analyze the endogenous choice between regular and irregular behaviour we develop a 
model in which the policymaker faces heterogeneous adjustment costs. The type of environment 
we consider is characterized by a continuously drifting state variable which can be adjusted using 
a costly control. The adjustment cost is assumed to include a lump-sum component, preventing 
the maintenance of the state variable continuously at the optimal level. The policymaker chooses 
the timing and/or the size of adjustment of the state variable so as to maximize the present value 
of  benefits,  net  of  adjustment  costs.  We  consider  a  very  simple  formulation,  in  which  the 
adjustment  cost  can  take  on  only  two  values.  We  show  that,  given  the  heterogeneity  in 
adjustment costs, the likelihood of adopting regular policies depends on the shape of the benefit 
function: the flatter it is, the more likely, ceteris paribus, is regular adjustment. Adjustment cost 
heterogeneity,  however,  is  not  sufficient  to  generate  unambiguous  implications  of  the  model 
when policymakers are identical.  
In order to obtain testable predictions, we add heterogeneity across policymakers. When 
policymakers  differ  with  respect  to  the  shape  of  the  benefit  function  (as  in  Konieczny  and 
Skrzypacz,  2006),  the  incidence  of  regular  adjustment  across  policymakers  is  negatively 
correlated with the frequency of adjustments across markets and is positively correlated with the 
average size of adjustment. On the other hand, if policymakers differ in terms of their adjustment 
costs (as in Dotsey, King and Wolman, 1999), the correlation with the frequency is positive and 
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We apply the model to nominal pricing decisions of monopolistic or monopolistically 
competitive firms. The state variable is the real price. It is eroded over time by inflation and can 
be adjusted by changing the nominal price, which is costly. We consider two types of regular 
adjustment: time-regular and state-regular. Time-regular adjustment is defined as changing prices 
at the beginning of a year or at the beginning of a quarter; state-regular adjustment is defined as 
setting prices at attractive levels (ending in a nine or round prices).  
  To  test  the  two  hypotheses  on  the  source  of  differences  across  firms  we  use  a  large 
Austrian  data  set.  It  consists  of direct  price  information  collected  by  the  Austrian  Statistical 
Office and covers 80% of the total CPI over the period 1996-2003. We run cross-sectional tests, 
regressing the excess proportion of price changes at the beginning of a year and at the beginning 
of a quarter and, separately, the proportion of attractive prices on the conditional frequencies of 
adjustment, inflation and its variability, dummies for good types, and other relevant variables. 
We find that the lower is, in a given market, the conditional frequency of price changes, the 
higher is the  incidence  of  both  time-  and  state-regular  price  changes.  Also,  the larger  is  the 
average size of price changes, the larger is the incidence of regular price changes. These results 
are consistent with markets being heterogeneous with respect to the shape of the profit function, 
but are not consistent with markets differing with respect to the value of the adjustment costs.  
  Our results have implications for the effectiveness of monetary policy and the slope of the 
Phillips curve. Regular price adjustment makes firms’ prices less flexible and monetary policy 
more effective. Our model implies that the lower is the inflation rate, the greater is the incidence 
of  regular  policies  and  so  the  greater  is  the  effect  of  a  given  monetary  change  on  output. 
Furthermore, the slope of the Phillips curve may be history-dependent. Assume that switching to 
a regular pricing policy involves a sunk cost, for example the cost of reorganizing the pricing 
department. Consider a decline in the inflation rate, followed by its increase to the previous level. 
As the inflation rate falls, firms incur the sunk cost and switch to regular price changes. When 
inflation returns to the previous value, firms may continue the regular policy given the sunk cost. 
As a result, individual firms’ pricing policies remain inflexible and, even though inflation is the 
same as before, monetary policy has greater effects on output.  
6
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“The  [FOMC]  committee  agreed  unanimously  to  lift  its 
benchmark federal funds rate […] its 16th consecutive quarter-
percentage-point increase since June 2004” The Washington Post, 
May 11, 2006. 
 
In many circumstances and in many environments, decision-makers choose to 
act on a regular basis and, in particular, on a calendar-regular basis (e.g. once a week, 
on  the  first  day  of  each  quarter,  etc.)  even  though  such  an  approach  appears 
suboptimal.  Similarly,  some  decision-makers  appear  to  prefer  some  values  of  the 
variables under their control (e.g. prices ending with a 9, interest rates which are 
multiples of 0.25% etc.). The focus of this paper is to analyze a simple explanation of 
such behaviour. 
A common feature of the environments in question is their dynamic structure. 
The policymaker(s) maximizes a stream of benefits, which depends on the values of 
some state variables. Over time these values change, or deteriorate.
1 The policymaker 
can reset the state variables but doing so involves a cost. Therefore adjustment is 
infrequent.  
The motivation, and the focus of the paper, is the analysis of nominal price 
adjustment at the firm level. In this application, a firm posts the nominal price for the 
product(s) it sells. Due to general inflation the real price falls over time. The real price 
can  be  reset  by  choosing  and  posting  a  new  value  of  the  nominal  price.  Similar 
problems arise in many other environments. Therefore we begin by describing issues 
related to regular adjustment using examples from various potential applications.  
 
1. Wage adjustment. Under general inflation, the purchasing power of contractually-
set wages declines over time. It can be increased in a new contract. 
 
2. Machinery refurbishing. The capital stock deteriorates over time due to physical 
use or obsolescence. It is improved by refurbishing or replacing the machinery. 
 
3. Inventory reordering. A firm holds an inventory of the product(s) it sells. The level 
of the inventory falls over time. It is replenished by a new delivery. 
 
                                                
1 Alternatively, the current values of the state variables are constant while the optimal values drift over 
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4. Monetary policy. The Central Bank sets the interest rate appropriate for the current 
conditions.  Over  time  the  match  between  the  current  and  the  optimal  value 
deteriorates.  The  interest  rate  can  be  readjusted  through  a  decision  of the  Bank’s 
policy-making body. 
 
5.  Fiscal  policy.  The  fiscal  authority  sets  spending  and  taxation  priorities  in  the 
budget. Over time the desired fiscal structure changes. It is reset in a new budget. 
 
6.  Information.  Newspapers  and  magazines  allow  the  public  to  update  their 
information. New events lead to its deterioration. A new issue brings the information 
up to date.  
 
7. Monitoring patients. A patient’s visit allows the physician to undertake a proper 
course  of  action.  Over  time  the  health  of  the  patient  or  the  effectiveness  of  the 
treatment  may  decline.  A  repeat  visit  allows  the  doctor  to  review  and  adjust  the 
treatment. 
 
These problems are fairly common. As discussed below, they often lead to 
state-contingent adjustment policies. The decision maker monitors the state variable 
and applies the control whenever it has deteriorated to the threshold point. Hence the 
timing of adjustment does not depend solely on time and, in general, adjustments are 
not regular. 
In practice, however, we observe many cases where controls are applied at 
regular moments of time. US grocery stores adjust prices on Wednesdays (Levy et al., 
1997); drugstores adjust prices on Fridays (Dutta et al., 1999). Seasonal sales are held 
every  January  and  July.  Many  firms  get  regular  deliveries.  Machinery  is  often 
refurbished on a regular basis. Labour contracts are signed for a fixed number of 
years. Magazines and newspapers appear with fixed frequency. Medical associations 
provide guidelines on the frequency of checkups and so on.  
In many cases some decision-makers follow regular policies while others do 
not.  While  some  firms  change  prices  at  predetermined  dates,  others  follow  state-
contingent optimal pricing policies (Cecchetti,1986). Observed hazard functions of 
price changes in the euro area countries suggest a coexistence of state-contingent and 
time-regular price setting
2 (Álvarez et al., 2005). Car firms change prices in the fall 
but  offer  incentives  on  a  state-contingent  basis  (depending  on  inventory  levels). 
Machinery is often refurbished when predetermined technical requirements are met. 
Some firms follow just-in-time delivery schedules, etc.  
                                                
2 What we call time-regular policy is usually called a time-contingent policy. For clarity we avoid the 
latter term; this allows us to distinguish between state-regular and state-contingent policies. 
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Even  when  the  policy  is  formally  regular,  it  sometimes  contains  specific 
provisions  for  deviating  from  the  schedule  if  needed.  The  interest  rate  may  be 
changed between the regular meetings of the policy makers; the government may 
introduce a mini-budget and so on.  
Furthermore, policymakers sometimes switch between regular and irregular 
policies. Several years ago the Bank of Canada officially moved from weekly to less 
frequent meetings. As implied by the above quote, in June 2004 the FED implicitly 
switched  to  regular  adjustments  every  six  weeks  by  0.25%.
3  Car  producers  have 
switched to just-in-time delivery policies. Most airlines nowadays use sophisticated 
pricing schedules, etc.  
Finally, some policymakers follow different policies for different activities. 
Paper versions of newspapers are published regularly, but electronic versions are not.
4 
Some supplies may be obtained regularly while others are procured on just-in-time 
basis. Doctors set regular, routine visits for some patients but not for others, etc. 
Understanding  of  regular  policies  is  important  since  such  policies  reduce 
flexibility by limiting the ability of the policymaker to react to past, current and future 
events. It is important to note that the distinction between expected and unexpected 
events is not crucial here. Once the system is set up to adjust on a regular basis, the 
policymaker may not be able to alter the course of action for a range of both expected 
and  unexpected  changes.  For  example,  a  central  bank  which  precommits  itself  to 
changing the interest rate on a regular basis may be unwilling to break the pattern in 
the face of either expected or unexpected events. 
Explanations  of  these  phenomena  depend  on  the  environment.  Regular 
scheduling  obviously  reduces  the  cost  of  maintenance  or  of  inventory  delivery. 
Regular  price  adjustment  may  have  strategic  benefits  (avoiding  price  war)  or 
reputational  benefits  (easier  acceptance  by  customers).
5  Regular  scheduling  of 
monetary policy decisions helps “reducing uncertainty in the financial markets…” and 
“…fixed dates will allow market participants to plan and operate more efficiently.”
6 
Regular  publishing  of  magazines  is  convenient  for  readers.  Guidelines  on  the 
frequency of checkups simplify physicians’ decisions, etc. 
                                                
3 In the previous 16 meetings (June 2002-May 2004) the interest rate was changed once by 0.5%, once 
by 0.25% and was unchanged 14 times; during the June 2000-May 2002 period it was changed eight 
times by 0.5%, three times by 0.25% and was left unchanged five times. 
4 We are grateful to Magdalena Konieczna for suggesting this example. 
5 See Rotemberg (2005) and (2006) for reputation – based adjustment models. 
6 Bank of Canada (2000).  
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Given the variety of environments and motives for adopting regular policies, 
in  this  paper  we  ask  whether  they  can  be  accounted  for  with  a  simple,  uniform 
framework. The model we use assumes that adjustment of the state variable is costly, 
but the adjustment costs are heterogeneous: they vary over time or over the values of 
the state variables. When the lower values of the costs occur regularly, for some 
policymakers  regular  adjustment  dominates  the  state-contingent  policy  that  would 
have been optimal if costs were homogeneous. 
In order to avoid misunderstanding we want to emphasize two points. First, 
the adoption of this simple assumption does not mean we argue that adjustment costs 
are, in fact, heterogeneous in a regular manner. Second, the proposed explanation is 
by no means trivial.  
With  regard  to  the  first  issue,  we  treat  the  assumption  of  regularly 
heterogeneous adjustment costs as a simple approach to a complex problem. While 
applicable  in  some  environments,  this  assumption  is  problematic  in  others.  For 
example, the average unit delivery cost is likely to be lower when the firm prearranges 
delivery of x truckloads every y weeks rather than order inventory as needed. On the 
other hand, it is not clear what reduction in costs is obtained by making interest rate 
decisions four times a year (as the Swiss National Bank does), or by 0.25% (as the 
FED has been doing). Furthermore, we adopt the simplest assumption possible: we 
assume that the cost of adjustment is lump-sum and takes on only two values: high 
and low. We do not claim that this extreme simplification is realistic, but rather ask 
whether,  with  this  assumption,  our  model  can  generate  observed  behaviour.  The 
answer is a clear yes.  
Using the assumption of heterogeneous costs may, at first thought, make our 
model appear trivial. As our analysis shows, however, that is not the case. We show 
that the  results  hold  for  an arbitrarily  small  difference  between the  high  and low 
values  of  the  costs.  Furthermore,  heterogeneous  costs  are  neither  sufficient  nor 
necessary to explain the incidence of regular behaviour. Additional assumptions are 
needed to obtain testable predictions. 
There are two aspects of regular nominal price adjustment we are interested in: 
time-regularity and state-regularity. A disproportionate proportion of price changes 
take place at the beginning of periods, rather than within periods. Several studies in 
the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN) report a high proportion of prices are held 
constant for a year (Álvarez et al., 2005 for Spain, Aucremanne and Dhyne, 2005 for 
10
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Belgium, Baudry et al., 2004 for France, Baumgartner et al., 2005 for Austria, Dias et 
al., 2005 for Portugal, Veronese et al., 2005 for Italy, Lünnemann and Mathä, 2005 
for Luxembourg and Hoffmann and Kurz-Kim, 2005 for Germany). Konieczny and 
Skrzypacz (2005) report that, in price data collected three times a month, over a half 
of all  changes  take  place  in  the first  10  days  of a  month.  Similarly,  several  IPN 
studies, as well as Bergen et al. (2003) and Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2006) find that 
a large proportion of prices charged are attractive prices.
7  
Consistent  with  our  approach,  several  studies  on  price  adjustment  have 
recently addressed the idea of heterogeneity in adjustment costs. Levy et al. (2005) 
explain  heterogeneity  in  price  rigidity  across  holiday  and  non-holiday  periods  by 
variations in the cost of price adjustment. The papers by Owen and Trzepacz (2000) 
and by Levy et al. (2002) also contain discussions along these lines. Dotsey, King and 
Wolman (1999) as well as Wolman (2000) consider cross-product variation in the cost 
of price adjustment.  
We  start  the  paper  by  showing  an  existence  result:  when  the  costs  of 
adjustment are lower at regular moments of time, and even when the difference is 
arbitrarily small, an optimizing policymaker will (except in unlikely circumstances) 
take advantage of the lower costs. We then show that, given the cost heterogeneity, 
the  likelihood  of  adopting  regular  policies  depends  on  the  shape  of  the  benefit 
function: the flatter it is, the more likely, ceteris paribus, is regular adjustment. In 
general,  however,  there  is  no  clear  relationship  between  the  degree  of  cost 
heterogeneity and the incidence of regular adjustment. In order to obtain empirical 
predictions we add heterogeneity across policymakers. We consider two sources or 
differences across policymakers: the shape of the benefit function (as in Konieczny 
and Skrzypacz, 2006 and the size of the adjustment costs as in Dotsey, King and 
Wolman, 1999). We provide sufficient conditions under which, with the differences 
across policymakers being due to the differences in the shape of the benefit function, 
the  frequency  of  adjustments  across  markets  is  negatively  correlated  with  the 
incidence  of  regular  adjustments.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  differences  across 
policymakers are due to the level of adjustment costs, the correlation is positive.  
                                                
7 Attractive prices – which sometimes are also called threshold prices or pricing points – include 
psychological prices (prices ending in 9), fractional prices (prices which are convenient to pay, such as 
1.50) and round prices (defined as whole number amounts, such as 10.00).  
11
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We then apply the model to nominal price adjustment. The distinction between 
the time contingent, regular nominal price adjustment policies (as in Fischer,1977 and 
in Taylor, 1980), and state-contingent policies (as in Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977), is 
crucial, given their different implications for effectiveness of monetary policy (Caplin 
and Spulber, 1987, Caplin and Leahy, 1992). 
To test the model we use a very large Austrian data set, which consists of the 
direct price information collected by the statistical office and covers about 80% of the 
CPI  over  eight  years.  We  run  cross-sectional  tests,  regressing  the  proportion  of 
attractive  prices  and,  separately,  the  excess  proportion  of  price  changes  at  the 
beginning  of  a  year  and  at  the  beginning  of  a  quarter  on  various  conditional 
frequencies of adjustment, inflation and its variability, dummies for good types, and 
other relevant variables. We find that the lower is, in a given market, the conditional 
frequency of price changes, the higher is the incidence of time- and state- regular 
adjustment. This is consistent with markets being heterogeneous with respect to the 
shape of the profit function, but not consistent with markets differing with respect to 
the value of the menu costs.  
  The paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced, and the empirical 
predictions  are  derived  in  the  next section.  In section  3  we  discuss  the  empirical 
evidence. Conclusions are in the last section. 
 
II. The Model. 
We consider a class of optimization problems where the value of instantaneous 
benefits  depends  on  state  variables  that  change  over  time.  More  formally,  the 
instantaneous value of the benefits is [ ( ), ( ), ] B x t y t a
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , where ( ) x t
￿
is a vector of state 
variables,  ( ) y t
￿
 is a vector of exogenous variables and   a
￿
 is a vector of parameters. 
This formulation implies that the benefit function depends on time only indirectly. 
We assume that  [ ( ), ( ), ] B x t y t a
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ is twice continuously differentiable and has a 
unique global maximum:  
 
A1.  For every , ( ), there exists *( ( ), ) such that, for every ( ) *: t y t a x y t a x t x ¹
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 
          
[ ( ), ( ), ] [ *, ( ), ] B x t y t a B x y t a <




Working Paper Series No 669
August 2006 
Assumption A1 implies that, as long as  and y a
￿ ￿
 do not change, the optimal 
instantaneous values of the state variables are constant.  
The policymaker would like to maintain the state variables continuously at the 
level  * x
￿
or, if that is not possible, to keep them close to * x
￿
. Changes in  ( ) x t
￿
over time 
will be called the deterioration of the state variables. The policy maker can adjust 
( ) x t
￿
 at any time to any desired level (perhaps within some bounds), but doing so 
involves a discrete cost.
8  
The cost  of adjusting  the state  variable, suggested by the examples above, 
includes the time, or the opportunity cost of the time needed to set up the decision-
making process (e.g. organizing an election and counting votes, the doctor’s and the 
patient’s time etc.), the time needed to make and implement the decision (e.g. the time 
needed to set up and implement a new budget, union/employer bargaining time etc.), 
physical resources (e.g. new machinery, printing a new price list etc.) and non-time 
opportunity  costs  (e.g.  foregone  output  whenever  production  is  affected  by  the 
refurbishing process etc.). 
To  simplify  the  analysis,  and  in  line  with  earlier  literature  (Scarf,  1959, 
Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977), we assume that the cost is lump-sum: independent of 
the size or of the frequency of adjustment. This is a reasonable assumption in some 
cases (monetary policy decisions, printing a new price list etc.).
9 
In general, the optimal solution to the optimization problems described above 
is state-contingent. The policymaker observes the values of the state variables and, 
when they reach certain thresholds, incurs the discrete cost and adjusts them to new, 
optimally  chosen  levels.  State-contingent  policies  imply,  generally,  adjustment  at 
intervals of differing length. Thresholds, as well as the new values of state variables 
are computed optimally and can take on any values (from an admissible range).  
As discussed in the introduction, in many environments, however, we observe 
behaviour inconsistent with state-contingent policies: adjustment often takes place at 
regular intervals and some values of the state variables are chosen more often than 
others. We focus, therefore, on adjustment policies which we call regular policies. We 
distinguish  between  time-regular  policies,  which  involve  adjustment  on  a  regular 
                                                 
8 In an equivalent problem, the optimal values change over time and the goal of the policymaker is to 
maintain the state variable as close as possible to the drifting optimal value, given the adjustment costs.  
9 Adjustment costs often include, in addition, a component which depends on the size of adjustment 
(refurbishing machinery, delivering a mini-budget etc.). We do not consider such cases here. 
13
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basis  (e.g.  a  firm  orders  new  inventory  every  48  days,  monetary  policy  decision 
making body meets every six  weeks, machinery  is refurbished once every sixteen 
months etc.) and state-regular policies, in which newly chosen values of the state 
variables belong to a small subset of all possible values (e.g. inventory is ordered by a 
truckload, a firm selects new prices ending in a nine: 0.69, 0.79 etc.). An important 
subset  of  time-regular  policies  are  calendar  time-regular  policies,  which  involve 
adjustment at calendar-related intervals (e.g. a new price list is issued once a year etc.) 
or where the time of applying the control is related to the calendar (e.g. sales are held 
at the beginning of each January and each July) 
  To make the analysis tractable we make several simplifying assumptions: 
 
A2.   Over the relevant range, and for any values of  ( ), y t a
￿ ￿
, the effect of the vector 
( ) x t
￿
on the benefit function  [ ( ), ( ), ] B x t y t a
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  can be completely summarized by 
a  single  state  variable  x(t).
10  i.e.  there  exists  B[.]  such  that 
[ ( ), ( ), ] [ ( ), ( ), ] B x t y t a B x t y t a º
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   and, 
for every , ( ), there exists *( ( ), ) t y t a x y t a
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
  such  that,  for  every ( ) *: x t x ¹  
* ' [ ( ), ( ), ] [ ( )] 0 B x t y t a x x t × - <
￿ ￿ . 
  where B’[.] denotes the derivative of the benefit function with respect to its 
first argument.  
 
  Assumption  A2  means  that  the  problem  is  equivalent  to  one  in  which  the 
benefit function is a smooth, quasiconcave function of a single state variable.  
  The crucial assumption, which differentiates the model from earlier literature, 
is that the cost of adjusting x(.) may depend on time or/and on the level of x. We now 
consider the former case; the latter is similar and is discussed below.  
  To  make  matters  as  simple  as  possible,  we  divide  time  into  periods  and 
assume that the cost of adjustment can take on only two values: high, ch , and low, cl . 
The cost is equal to the lower value for adjustment at the beginning of a period, and to 
the higher value for adjustments within a period. Some notation will be helpful. Let 
0 1 { , ,...} t t Áº consist of the beginnings of each period. The interval [ ) 1 , i i t t + , i=1, 2… 
will be called period i. Whenever the adjustment takes place at  tÎÁ, its cost is cl . 
Such  adjustment  will  be  called  regular  adjustment  and  the  incidence  of  regular 
                                                 
10 A somewhat stronger restriction is that all but one (say, the first) of the elements of the vector of state 
variables  ( ) x t
￿
are fixed, i.e. 
0 0 0
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adjustments    (IRA)  will  be  the  proportion  of  all  adjustments  which  are  regular, 
0 1 IRA £ £ .  
 
A3.   The cost of adjustment is: 
( ) ( ) ( ), h l h h l c t c I t c c c c = + × - ³         (1) 
 








ÎÁ ￿ = ￿ ÏÁ ￿
          (2) 
 
As the focus of the paper is regular behaviour, we further assume that periods 
are of the same length, i.e.  ' s i t  are evenly spaced over time: 
0 , 1,2,.... i n n t t t = + × =         (3) 
 
Obviously, the larger is the difference between the high and low values of 
costs, the more tempting is regular adjustment and so a large value of ch - cl makes the 
problem trivial. Therefore we are careful not to make any assumptions about the size 
of the difference. All results hold even if the ch - cl  is arbitrarily small.  
In this paper we concentrate on the simple nonstochastic case. In particular: 
A4.  The state variable x(t) is assumed to change over time at a constant rate:
11 
 
        0 ( )
0 ( ) ( )
t t x t x t e
a - - = ×           (4) 
 
Without loss of generality, we assume ￿>0.  
  At  the  time  of  the  first  adjustment  the  policymaker’s  goal  is  to  pick  the 
sequences  of  times  of  adjustment  and  the  new  values  of  the  state  variable, 
0 1 1 2 2 { ,( , ),( , ),...} W x t x t x º  so as to maximize the present value of the benefits: 
 
{ }
{ } { }
1 1 ( )
0
0 0




t t t t t
i t
i
i i i i
PV W B x e y t a e dt c t e
t x
a r r + +
¥
- - - -
¥ ¥ =
= =
= - ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
           (5) 
 
                                                 
11 As already mentioned, an equivalent problem is when the optimal value of the state variable changes 
over time and adjustments are needed to keep the actual value close to the optimal value. The second 
application of our theory we consider in this paper, i.e. level-regular adjustment, falls into that 
category: The state variable in this case is the nominal price whose optimal value (the optimal real 
price) drifts over time. Optimal adjustment entails resetting the price to these drifting levels or, given 
the heterogeneous adjustment costs across levels, to a level with lower adjustment cost. This problem 
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where  PV(W)  denotes  the  present  value  of  policy  W,  t0  is  the  time  of  the  first 
adjustment,  ￿  is  the  discount  factor,  and  the  first  adjustment  is  assumed  to  be 
costless.
12 
  The solution strategy we adopt is to start with the baseline case when  , y a
￿ ￿do 
not change over time and the cost of adjustment is constant and equal to its higher 
value, i.e. cl=ch . We then compare  outcomes under heterogeneous costs with  the 
baseline case. Note that in both cases the value of ch is the same; they differ by the 
value of cl. To set notation, the optimal policy under either case will be denoted with a 
“*” and the policy under the baseline case will be denoted with a “^”. 
 
Lemma 1.   
  Assume cl = ch. Let  { }
* * * * * *
0 1 1 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,( , ),( , ),... W x t x t x º denote the optimal policy, and  
  { }
* * *
1 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ , ,... T t t = denote the set of the optimal adjustment times.  
  Then 
* ˆ W   is  recursive: 
* * ˆ : and i i x x " = ,  for  all  i
* * *
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ
i i t t t + = + D .  Also, 
* ˆ W is 
unique.
13  Finally, 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , , ) ( , , )
t
h B x y a B xe y a c
a r
- D - =
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
 
The proof is essentially the same as in Sheshinski and Weiss (1977). 
 
 
2.1. Positive Incidence of Regular Adjustments. 
 
We now turn to showing an existence result: except in unlikely circumstances, 
the incidence of regular adjustments is positive: IRA>0. In other words, it is optimal 
for the policymaker to take advantage of the lower adjustment costs. Of course it is 
important that the incidence of regular adjustment is not driven by the cost saving. 
Proposition 1 below shows sufficient conditions under which, when cl < ch , we get 
IRA>0 even if the difference ch - cl is arbitrarily small. The proof is based on the 
following approximation of real numbers with rational numbers: 
 
Lemma 2. 
  For  every  x,K>0  there  exist  integers  N1,  N2  such  that  N2￿K  and 
2 1 1/ N x N K × - < .  
 
Proof: see Niven (1961).  
                                                 
12 As we consider the nonstochastic case here, we omitted expectations from equation (5). 
13 Note that, since the optimized present value of benefits may be negative, no additional restrictions 
are placed on the values of the parameters and the momentary benefit function B. 
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  The  lemma  can  be  applied  to  the  problem  considered  here  by  setting 
* ˆ / x t t = D . It implies that, if the policymaker follows a policy of adjusting once every 
* ˆ t D (which  is  optimal  when  costs  of  adjustment  are  constant),  eventually  an 
adjustment will take place arbitrarily close to the beginning of a period. Given the 
notation, for an arbitrary value of K, the N2th adjustment will be within 1/K of the 
beginning of period N1 . 
  Since the N2th adjustment is close to the beginning of a period, the firm needs 
to  alter  its  timing  just  a  little  to  take  advantage  of  the  lower  beginning-of-period 
adjustment costs. It will do so as long as the reduction in adjustment costs exceeds the 
loss in benefits. Obviously, as already mentioned, we do not want the result to depend 
on the difference ch - cl . A sufficient condition for the results to hold regardless of the 
size of ch - cl is that the slope of the benefit function be bounded; this is the motivation 
for assumption (b) below:  
 
Proposition 1.  
Let  { }
* * * * * *
0 1 1 2 2 ,( , ),( , ),... W x t x t x º denote  the  optimal  policy,  and 
{ }
* * * *
0 1 2 , , ,... T t t t = denote the set of the optimal adjustment times, when cl<ch. 
Assume that: 
(a) c(t) meets (1)-(3);  
(b) the time of the first adjustment  0 t ÎÁ  
(c) for every , there exists y a A< ¥









Without loss of generality let the time of the first adjustment be  0 0 t t = . The proof is 
by  contradiction.  Assume  that 
*
0 { } T t ÇÁ= .  Therefore,  by  Lemma  1,  the  set  of 
optimal adjustment times is 
* ˆ T , with 
*
0 0 ˆ t t = . By Lemma 2, setting A=K, there exist 
two positive integers N1 and N2 such that: 
 
*
2 1 ˆ (1/ )ln( / ) h l N t N c c t r D - <           (6a) 
 
    ( )
*
2 1 ˆ /(2 ) h N t N c c A t r D - < - ￿          (6b) 
 
When (6a) and (6b) are met we have:  
 
( )
* ˆ ( ) ( *) PV W PV W PV W < £  
17
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Where  { }
* * * * * *
0 0 2 0 1 0 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , ),...,( ( 1) , ),( , ),( ( 1) , ),... W x N t x N x e N t x
a t t t t t
W = + - D + + + D  and 
*
2 1 ˆ N t N t W = D -  . The second inequality follows from the fact that the middle policy 
need not be optimal for cl < ch.              ￿ 
 
  Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. It describes the situation in which, 
under  constant  adjustment  costs  (i.e.  when  l h c c =   and  ˆ * W   is  optimal),  the  N2th 
adjustment would take place  W after the beginning of period N1. Consider policy W 
defined, in comparison to  ˆ * W ,  as follows: (i) until 
*
0 2 ˆ ( 1) N t t + - ×D , and from just 
after
*
0 2 ˆ N t t + ×D  on,  ˆ * W W = ; (ii) instead of adjusting at 
*
0 2 ˆ N t t + ×D  (as is optimal 
under  ˆ * W ), the timing of N1th adjustment is accelerated by  W to  0 1 N t t + × , which 
allows to take advantage of the lower adjustment costs. Inequalities (6a) and (6b) 
provide sufficient conditions for the present value of W (the middle term in the above 
inequality) to exceed the present value of 
* ˆ W . 
14 
 


















                                                
14 Inequalities (6a) and (6b) provide sufficient conditions also for the case when adjustment is delayed. 
W
t
0 1 N t t + ×
* ˆ W W
( ) B t
( )
* ˆ * ˆ
t B x e
a - D
( )
* ˆ B x e
aW
* ˆ ( ) B x
*
0 2 ˆ N t t + ×D
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  Proposition  1  shows  that,  when  the  adjustment  costs  vary  over  time  as 
postulated in A3 and the first adjustment is at the beginning of period 0 ( 0 t ÎÁ), under 
general  conditions  the  policymaker  would,  sooner  or  later,  take  advantage  of  the 
lower costs of adjustment. Assumption (c) requires a discussion. If the time of the first 
adjustment  0 t ÏÁ, it is possible that the policymaker will never take advantage of 
lower adjustment costs. This would be the case if, for example,  ˆ t t D =  (i.e. when the 
optimal time between adjustments under constant costs is equal to the length of a 
period) and the difference between cl and ch is small. 
  In  many  environments,  however,  0 t ÏÁ  is  an  unlikely  outcome.  This  is 
because the timing of the whole sequence of subsequent adjustment times,  { } 0 *\ T t , 
often  depends  on  the  time  of  the  first  adjustment.  For  example,  the  timing  of 
subsequent visits to a doctor is set relative to the initial visit, dates of subsequent 
delivery depend on initial delivery etc.
15 From now on we will assume that  0 t ÎÁ . 
  By Proposition 1, at least one time of adjustment under W* coincides with the 
beginning of a period. To set notation, assume that the first such adjustment is the Nth 
adjustment, and it takes place at the end of period k. Denote such a policy as 
*
, N k W . 
This means that, under 
*
, N k W ,  { }
* *
0 inf { \{ } N k t T t t = ÇÁ = ,  
It is easy to see that, for a given benefit function and adjustment costs, the 
optimal policy need not be unique. It is possible that 
*
1 ˆ
k N k t t t + < <  and PV(
*
, N k W ) = 
PV(
*
, 1 N k W + ), i.e. the policymaker is indifferent between accelerating or delaying the 
Nth adjustment. 
The analysis of multiple equilibria in the current framework is complex. We 
therefore assume that, if PV(
*
, N k W ) = PV(
*
, 1 N k W + ) then  * *
, N k W W = , i.e. whenever two 
policies yield the same present value of benefits, the policymaker chooses the policy 
with later adjustments. 
 
                                                
15 In environments in which the timing of adjustment is dictated by custom this need not be the case. 








* W is recursive: 
 
{ }
* * * * * * * * * * *





* W can be written as:  { }
* * * * * *
0 0 1 1 1 1 ( , ),( , ),...,( , ) , *( ) N N k W x t x t x W t t
+
- - ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿  , where  ( ) k W t
+  is 
the remainder of the optimal policy from period  k t  forward. Since 
* W  is optimal and 
unique,  by  the  principle  of  optimality  ( ) k W t
+ is  the  solution  to  the  problem  of 
maximizing the present value of the benefits, starting in period  k t . But this problem is 
identical  to  the  original  problem,  as  can  be  checked  by  substituting, 
* *
i i N t t - = . 
Therefore, 
*
2 2 N k t t =   and 
* for every such that 2 : i i N i N t < < ÏÁ.  The  proposition 
follows by induction. 
￿ 
 
The crucial question arising in this framework is the empirical incidence of 
adjustment at times inÁ, i.e. the value of IRA. By proposition 2, IRA=1/N: as the first 
adjustment in  Á is the Nth adjustment and the optimal policy 
* W is recursive, every 
1/Nth adjustment is in Á.
16  
Proposition 1 is an existence result: it shows that IRA>0 as long as ch > cl 
(even if the difference ch - cl is arbitrarily small) and the benefit function is not too 
steep, and subject to the discussion above. While this result is interesting, it has little 
empirical content, especially given the fact that the starting point of the analysis is the 
observation that many policies are, indeed, regular: some prices are changed at the 
beginning of the year, firms sometimes order a delivery of multiple truckloads etc. 
Therefore we now turn to the analysis of the factors which determine the incidence of 
regular adjustment.  
 
2.2. Factors Affecting the Incidence of Regular Adjustment (IRA). 
We  address  the  determination  of  IRA  in  two  steps.  First,  we  consider  the 
determinants of the incidence of regular adjustment for a single policymaker. Then we 
                                                
16 Of particular interest is the special case of IRA=1, i.e. when N=1  * T Í Á  and the firm never pays ch. 
Of course,  * T may be a proper subset of Á (i.e. * T Ì Á ) when N=1, for example if the optimal 
adjustment frequency is once every two periods.  
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analyze  empirical  predictions  of  the  model,  under  two  alternative  assumptions 
regarding the differences between policymakers.  
Before  we  proceed  we  need  to  define  precisely  when  a  policymaker  will 
deviate from the optimal policy  ˆ * W  (i.e. the policy that she would have followed if 
adjustment costs were constant) to take advantage of the lower costs. We call it the 
shift range: 
 
Definition:  The  shift  range  Si  = 
* * ˆ ˆ , i i i i t a t b ￿ ￿ - + ￿ ￿is  an  interval  such  that  the 
following two conditions are met: 
  (a) the policymaker moves the ith adjustment from 
* ˆ
i t  to some j t  if and 
only if  * * ˆ ˆ i i j i t a t t - £ < ; 
  (b) the policymaker moves the ith adjustment from 
* ˆ
i t  to  1 j t + , if and only 
if  * *
1 ˆ ˆ i j i i t t b t + < £ + . 
 
  In other words the policymaker moves the timing of the ith adjustment, which 
falls within period j, to the beginning of period j or to the beginning of period j+1 if 
and only if the optimal timing under constant adjustment costs falls in the shift range 
Sj. Due to the fact that, by Proposition 2, W* is recursive, the index i is counted from 
0 t  (or, equivalently, from the last time adjustment is at the beginning of a period). As 
before,  we  assume  that  if  the  policymaker  is  indifferent  between  accelerating  or 
delaying adjustment, she chooses to delay it.   
  We  now  make  two  additional  simplifying  assumptions  that  are  sufficient, 
although not necessary, to derive the remaining results: 
A5.   The benefit function is quadratic in the state variable x:  
( ) { }
2 [ ( ), ( ), ] , [ ( ), ] B x t y t a qx rx s b y t a = F - + +
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 
  where the functional  (, ) F × ×  is an identity in its first argument.
17 
A6.   The discount factor r =0. 
   
  The  shift  range  Si  determines  the  willingness  of  the  policymaker  to  take 
advantage of the lower adjustment costs. The size of Si depends on two factors: the 
size of the difference ch –cl and the value of benefits foregone by departing from  ˆ * W . 
                                                
17 This formulation allows for different effects on the value of benefits of other state variables and of 
parameters,  for  example  multiplicative  ( )
2 [ ( ), ( ), ] [ ( ), ] B x t y t a qx rx s b y t a = - + + ×
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
  or  exponential 
( )
[ ( ), ] 2 [ ( ), ( ), ]
b y t a
B x t y t a qx rx s = - + +
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The policymaker faces a trade-off between reducing adjustment cost and the reduction 
in  benefits  brought  about  by  not  following  ˆ * W .  The  loss  depends  on  how  fast 
benefits decline as the time of adjustment varies. This, in turn, depends on the slope of 
the benefit function. A benefit function that is, at a given distance from its maximum, 
flat, makes the loss small and so the policymaker is willing to vary adjustment time to 






2 be two benefit functions with parameters q
1 and q
2 and 
1 2 , i i S S be 
their respective shift ranges. If q
1 > q
2 then, for all i,  
1 2
i i b b £  and 
1 2
i i a a £ . 
 
Proof.  
We consider the postponement of the times of the ith adjustments  *1 ˆi t  and  *2 ˆi t , i.e. that 
1 2
i i b b £ ; the proof for the acceleration of   *1 ˆi t  and  *2 ˆi t  is analogous. Assume i is the 
lowest index such that  *1 1 ˆi i t S Î . This means  *1
i t  is delayed until the nearest beginning 
of the period, say period k1:  *1
1 i k t t =  and all prior adjustments are within periods. It is 
easy  to  show  that,  since  the  discount  rate  is  zero  by  A6,  the  times  between 
adjustments  are  all  of equal  length: 
1
0 0 * ( ) ( / ) j k t j i t t t - = - × for  all  j£i. Therefore 
shifting the time of the ith adjustment from  *1
i t  to  1 k t involves extending all i times 
between adjustments by ( )
*1
1 / k i t i t - . Since  *1 1 ˆi i t S Î , the saving on adjustment costs, 
h l c c -  is greater than i times the loss of extending adjustment time (and changing 
appropriately the new value of x). 
  Assume now that  *2 *1
2 1 ˆ ˆ k i k i t t t t - = -  where  2 k t  is the first beginning of the 
period following  *2 ˆi t . The benefit from postponing  *2 ˆi t  is the saving on adjustment 
costs and is the same as for B
1 but, as q
1 > q
2, the cost of the postponement is lower. 
This means that, for B
2 , the benefit exceeds the cost. Therefore  *2 , 2 k m t m k t = ³ , 
which implies 
1 2
i i b b £ . 
￿ 
 
2.3. The Number Problem. 
Proposition 3 shows that, for a given difference 
* ˆ
i t  -  k t  and  1 k t + - 
* ˆ
i t , the 
flatter is the benefit function at the optimal choice, the more likely is the policymaker, 
ceteris paribus, to take advantage of lower adjustment costs. But that does not mean 
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that the relationship between the second derivative of the benefit function and the 
incidence of regular adjustment is unambiguous. This is because the differences 
* ˆ
i t  - 
k t   and  1 k t + - 
* ˆ
i t ,  depend  on  the  parameters  of  the  model  in  a  way  that  depends 
crucially  on  what  we  call  the  number  problem.  Essentially,  when  l h c c =   for  any 
benefit  function  the  optimal  time  of  adjustment  may  happen  to  fall  close  to  the 
beginning of a period and so a high incidence of regular adjustment may happen just 
by coincidence. 
To provide an example, consider a given problem in which  0 0 t t =  and 
* ˆ t D  is 
a well-defined, continuous function of the exogenous variables  y
￿
 and the parameter 
vectora
￿
. Assume further that, for some particular values of the exogenous variables 
and parameters, 0 y
￿
 and 0 a
￿
, we have 
* ˆ t D =t , i.e. under constant adjustment costs it is 
optimal for the policymaker to always adjust at the beginning of the period. In this 
case  the  policy  is  completely  regular  (IRA=1)  in  a  neighborhood  of  0 0 ( , ) y a
￿ ￿
  but 
IRA<1  outside  this  neighborhood.  Since  there  is,  in  general,  nothing  special 
about 0 0 ( , ) y a
￿ ￿
, the resulting policy is regular just by coincidence.  
As a more specific example, assume that B=B(x,a), i.e. the benefit function 
depends  on  the  state  variable  and  one  parameter.  Assume  that  the  parameter  is 
observable and its value is positively related to
* ˆ t D . This is the setup considered by 
Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), where B[.] is the real profit function of a monopolist, x 
is the real price and a is the inflation rate. Let adjustment costs vary as postulated 
here. Assume that a researcher studies six policymakers and the observable parameter 
a is distributed across policymakers in such a way that their (unobservable) optimal 
periods of adjustment under constant cost,
* ˆ
i t D , are equal 10+i/32 months, i=15,…,20. 
Assume further that the difference between the high and low level of adjustment costs 
is so small that they never depart from ˆ * W . The incidence of regular adjustments she 
observes is summarized in Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1 
Monthly frequency of adjustment (%)  9.41  9.44  9.47  9.50  9.52  9.55 
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There  is  no  easy  way around  the  number  problem.  A potential  solution  is 
suggested by the empirical implementation below, which treats the average frequency 
of  adjustments  as  an  indicator  of  cross-policymaker  heterogeneity.  If  the  average 
frequency of adjustment is the variable of interest, the number problem is eliminated 
if the following condition on the empirical distribution of 
* ˆ t D  over time is met:  
 
C1. The empirical distribution of 
* ˆ t D on { } 1, i i t t - is independent of i. 
   
 
Under this condition, the probability of finding a policymaker for whom the 
timing of the kth adjustment,  ˆ* k t D , is within a given distance from the beginning of 
the period is the same for all periods.  
The  problem  with  this  condition  is  that  it  is  not  met  in  practice  due  to 
truncation of the range of k
* ˆ t D   both from below and above.  The truncation from 
below is due to the fact that, under lump-sum costs, 
* ˆ t D is bounded away from zero 
but 
* ˆ t D is not bounded away from above from ￿, 2 ￿,… The truncation from above is 
due to the fact that the limited length of the sample makes it impossible to observe 
policies  *
, N k W  for which kt  exceeds the length of the sample. Therefore it is possible 
for results of empirical tests of the model to be dominated by the number problem. 
This makes it difficult to interpret rejections of the model since an empirical test of 
the model is a joint test of the relationship between benefit function shape and the 
incidence  of  regular  adjustments  as  well  as  the  fact  that  the  number  problem  is 
“averaged out” in the data set. But the number problem is essentially a statistical issue 
unlikely  to  be  affected  by  the  considerations  of  the  model.  Hence  it  becomes 
irrelevant if the results of empirical tests are consistent with the model.  
 
2.4.  Empirical  Predictions  under  Different  Assumptions  about  Policymaker 
Heterogeneity. 
 
The discussion above indicates that a model in which all firms are identical 
and  their  adjustment  costs  vary  as  postulated  in  A3  does  not,  in  general,  have 
unambiguous empirical implications. To obtain empirical predictions of the model, 
and  avoid  results  being  dominated  by  the  number  problem,  heterogeneity  across 
24
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policymakers is needed. Furthermore, testing should use a large data set. The second 
requirement  rules  out,  for  practical  purposes,  time-series  analysis  since  long  data 
series on the timing of adjustments are difficult to obtain. In the next subsection we 
therefore discuss empirical implications of the model under two different assumptions 
on cross-sectional heterogeneity across policymakers. 
  To obtain empirical predictions of the model we consider alternative sources 
of  differences  across  policymakers:  (a)  with  respect  to  the  shape  of  the  benefit 
function, (b) with respect to the value of adjustment costs and (c) with respect of the 
rate of deterioration, ￿, of the state variable. We focus on the first two as they are 
tested in the next section; our data are insufficient to test model implications for the 
third one.  
  In terms of the model the benefit function heterogeneity is represented by the 
value of the parameter q, which determines the concavity of benefit function,. The 
adjustment cost heterogeneity is represented by the high value of the adjustment cost, 
ch, with the difference ch –cl  kept constant. 
  Both types of heterogeneity have been used in the modeling of optimal pricing 
policies  under  the  assumption  of  costly  price  adjustment.  The  first  type  was 
considered by Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2006) who analyze an equilibrium optimal 
pricing model with costly price adjustment and consumer search for the best price. 
Their  model,  briefly  described  in  the  next  section,  implies  that  the  greater  is  the 
consumer propensity to search for the best price in a given market, the greater is the 
value of the parameter q. The second type of heterogeneity was considered by Dotsey, 
King and Wolman (1999) who develop a tractable framework incorporating costly 
price adjustment into a general equilibrium model. In their approach firms differ with 
respect to their adjustment costs. 
  As  shown  below, the  two  assumptions  produce  opposite  results  and  so  an 
empirical study we propose can, potentially, discriminate between them under the 




Consider an environment with many policymakers whose benefit functions are 
as  in  A5,  and  whose  adjustment  costs  vary  over  time  (or  over  states)  as 
postulated in A3. For all policymakers let  ˆ* (0, ] n t t Î , n³1 and assume that 
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the condition  C1 is met for all  i£n. Assume further that policymakers  are 
identical except for one source of heterogeneity across policymakers: 
 
(a) If the differences across policymakers are due to differences in the value of 
q,  then the lower is q, the less frequent is adjustment and the higher is the 
incidence of regular adjustment. 
 
(b) If the differences across policymakers are due to differences in the value of 
ch and cl (so that ch - cl is the same across policymakers) then the higher ch , 




(c) If the differences across policymakers are due to differences in the value of 
a , then the lower is the value of a , the less frequent is adjustment and the 
higher is the incidence of regular adjustment. 
 
Proof: 
The effect on the frequency of adjustment in 4(a) follows directly from the Lemma 
(Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2006)); in 4(b) it follows directly from Sheshinski and 
Weiss  (1977),  section  5  and  in  4(c)  it  follows  directly  from  Proposition  2  in 
Sheshinski  and  Weiss  (1977)  since  the  quadratic  benefit  function  meets  their 
condition (M).
19 The effects on IRA follow directly from proposition 3.  
￿ 
 
III. Empirical Evidence. 
 
  We test the model by analyzing optimal pricing policies at the firm level. In 
the  pricing  application  the  benefit  function  B[.,.,.]  is  the  profit  function  of  a 
monopolistic, or monopolistically competitive firm which produces a single product. 
Under general inflation at the rate ￿, its real price falls over time. To reset it the firm 




                                                 
18 To avoid confusion note that in (b) there are two sources of heterogeneity in adjustment costs. The 
first source is heterogeneity in the size of adjustment costs over time (or over states), as postulated in 
A3. It is the same for all policymakers. The second source is heterogeneity across policymakers. In (a) 
and (c) the differences in adjustment costs are due to the first source only. 
19 As long as  ˆ ˆ*exp( *) */2 x t x a - D > ￿ , where  * x ￿  is the benefit-maximizing value of x in the absence of 
any adjustment costs.  This inequality is met in our empirical study in the next section. 
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3.1. Tested Hypotheses. 
  The data allow us to analyze the incidence  of both  time-regular and state-
regular policies. We define a time-regular policy as price adjustment at the beginning 
of the year, and, separately, as price adjustment at the beginning of a quarter. We will 
refer to such policies as seasonal price setting. State-regular policies involve choosing 
attractive prices: prices that end in a nine or round prices. The definition (values) of 
attractive prices is given in the Appendix. 
  Our data set, which we describe below, does not allow for a direct test of 
Proposition 4(c) as the variation in the inflation rate in the data is small. Therefore we 
concentrate on the differences across firms in the shape of the profit function and in 
the values of adjustment costs. 
  Our H0 hypothesis, implied by Proposition 4(a), is that the adjustment costs 
vary  as  postulated  and  that  the  differences  across  policymakers  are  due  to 
heterogeneity  in  the  shape  of  the  profit  function,  as  in  Konieczny  and  Skrzypacz 
(2006). The alternative, implied by Proposition 4(b), is that the differences are due to 
heterogeneity in the level of price adjustment costs, as in Dotsey, King and Wolman 
(1999).   
  The  data  set  used  to  test  the  model  is  extensive  and  the  variation  in  the 
endogenous  variable  is  large.  Therefore  we  would  treat  an  insignificant  estimated 
coefficient on the adjustment frequency as a rejection of the model, notwithstanding 
the  number  problem.  If  the  coefficient  is  negative  and  significant,  we  treat  it  as 
support for the joint hypothesis that menu costs vary as postulated and heterogeneity 
across markets is due to differences in the shape (curvature) of the profit function. If it 
is positive and significant, we treat it as support for the joint hypothesis that menu 
costs vary as postulated and heterogeneity across markets is due to differences in the 
size of the menu costs.  
  Since neither the curvature nor the value of adjustment costs is observable in 
our data, a direct test of the model is not possible. However, an indirect test of the 
model  can  be  performed  with  another  variable  acting  as  an  instrument  for  the 
unobservable variable. In view of Proposition 4, we treat the adjustment frequency as 
the instrument.  
  Before we turn to the data, we now briefly describe the two underlying models 
of policymaker heterogeneity.  
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  Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2006) analyze a model, based on Bénabou (1992), 
in which firms face nominal adjustment costs and consumer search for the best price. 
They consider a market for a single good which is supplied by a continuum of firms, 
each with the same marginal cost MC. Firms set nominal prices so as to maximize the 
average value of real profits per unit of time. Nominal prices are eroded by constant 
inflation  at  the  rate  ￿.  As  price  adjustment  is  costly,  nominal  prices  are  changed 
infrequently. In the absence of perfect synchronization prices differ across firms.  
  Each period a new cohort of v consumers per firm arrives in the market. Each 
consumer buys 0 or k units of the good and exits the market. Consumers search for the 
best  price.  They  are  heterogeneous  in  terms  of their  adjustment  costs  c,  which is 
distributed  uniformly  over  the  range  [0,C]  in  each  cohort.  Heterogeneity  across 
markets is due to differences in the values of the parameters k and C, which determine 
the propensity to search for the best price, and the density of customers, v.  
  The model is directly applicable to our framework. Konieczny and Skrzypacz 
(2006) show that the profit function is, using our notation
20 B(x) = - qx
2+rx+s. The 
parameter q, which is crucial in our study since it determines the concavity of the 
benefit function, is a simple function of k, C and v: q=vk
2/C. More active search for 
the best price, due to a large amount spent on the good (large k) or low search costs 
(represented by a low maximum value C), or a large number of customers (large v), 
lead to more concave profit functions. 
  Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) develop a general equilibrium framework 
for the dynamic analysis of the effects of various macro disturbances in the presence 
of price adjustment costs. In their model both firms and consumers are long lived. 
Consumers  have  Dixit-Stiglitz  preferences  for  variety  and  so  firms  are 
monopolistically  competitive.  Heterogeneity  is  due  to  differences  in  the  value  of 
adjustment  costs:  firms  draw  them  independently  over  time  from  a  continuous 
distribution.  
  The model is a general equilibrium one, but for fixed values of exogenous 
parameters  it  can  be  interpreted  as  a  multi-market  model.  As  the  Dixit-Stiglitz 
preferences imply constant-elasticity demand, the profit functions are not quadratic. 
The results of our model hold when the profit functions can be approximated with a 
quadratic,  i.e.  for  low  values  of  adjustment  costs  and/or  low  inflation.  While  the 
                                                 
20 Here x is the real price, q=vk
2/C, r=q(C/k+E(x)+MC), s= MC ￿[C/k+E(x)] and E(x) is the average 
price in the market. 
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values  of  adjustment  costs  are  not  observable,  during  the  period  under  study  the 
inflation rate in Austria never exceeded 3.4%. 
 
3.2. Data. 
To test the model we use a very large Austrian data set. It is the data set 
analyzed in Baumgartner et al. (2005) who studied the stylized facts of price setting in 
Austria.
21 It contains monthly price quotes collected by the Austrian statistical office, 
which are used in the computation of the Austrian CPI. The sample spans the period 
from  January  1996  to  December  2003  (96  months)  and  contains  about  40  000 
elementary price records per month. Overall, the data set contains about 3.6 million 
individual price quotes and covers roughly 80% of the total Austrian CPI. Each record 
includes, in addition to the nominal price, the information on the product category, 
date, outlet (shop), packaging type, a sales indicator and a number of other indicators.  
We identify a “policymaker” with a product category, i.e. a product at the 
elementary  level  included  in  the  CPI  basket,  for  example  milk,  rather  than  an 
individual store/product pair.
22 We need a large number of price changes to compute 
the conditional frequencies used in the empirical testing. Thus we implicitly assume 
that heterogeneity is across markets and all firms operating on a given market (selling 
a given product) share the same profit function or adjustment costs.  
The original data set (used in Baumgartner et al., 2005) contains a total of 668 
product  categories.  We excluded  151  product  categories  with  administered  prices, 
excessive price changes and products for which we had data for several varieties.
23 
We  eliminated  all  products  with  an  average  size  of  price  changes  of  more  than 
50%.We suspect that, in such cases the definition of the product (on which no direct 
information is available in the data set) has been changed during the sample period. 
Hence the requirement of Proposition 4(c) – see footnote 19 – is met in our data. This 
leaves  517  product  categories  for  our  analysis.  The  average  frequency  of  price 
                                                 
21 They describe in detail the data and some manipulations which have been carried out prior to the 
statistical analysis.  
22 Treating an individual store/product pair as a policymaker would require calculating the average 
frequency of price changes from too few observations, especially for stores which change prices 
infrequently. 
23 For some product categories the data set contains prices for several varieties (for example prices of 
car insurance for different types of cars). These prices are usually changed jointly and so, in such cases, 
we considered only the price for the variety with the highest CPI weight.  
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The analysis raises the issue of causality. Our model implies that infrequent 
price  changes  and  high  incidence  of  regular  adjustments  coincide  because  of  a 
common  causal  characteristic  (flat  profit  function  or  low  adjustment  costs).  But 
several studies in the Inflation Persistence Network imply causation from what we 
call regular adjustment to the frequency of price changes. In the data set we are using, 
Baumgartner et al (2005) find that the probability of price adjustment, conditional on 
the last price being an attractive price, is lower than the unconditional probability. 
Similar results have been documented by Álvarez and Hernando (2004) for Spain, 
Aucremanne  and  Dhyne  (2005)  for  Belgium,  Veronese  et  al.  (2005)  for  Italy, 
Lünnemann and Mathä (2005) for Luxembourg, Hoffmann and Kurz-Kim (2005) for 
Germany and Dhyne et al. (2005) for a panel of euro area countries. This means that, 
were we simply to analyze the relationship between the frequency of price changes 
and the incidence of attractive prices, we may discover a negative relationship where 
causality  goes  from  the  proportion  of  attractive  prices  to  low  price  changing 
frequency: in markets in which the proportion of attractive prices is high, the average 
frequency of price changes will be low.  
In  order  to  overcome  this  potential  problem  of  reverse  causality  in  our 
regression, we need a measure for the frequency of price changes that is independent 
of  the  proportion  of  attractive  prices.  Therefore  we  condition  the  frequency  of 
adjustment on, separately, attractive and non-attractive prices: for product category i 
we calculate the average conditional frequency of a price change given that the last 
price  is  an  attractive  price  and,  separately,  as  the  conditional  frequency  of  price 
changes  given  that  the  last  price  is  not  an  attractive  price.  We  then  use  both 
conditional frequencies in the regression as explanatory variables. The use of both 
conditional frequencies avoids the results being affected by the mixture of attractive 
and other prices in the given market. 
While  we  are  not  aware  of  similar  empirical  evidence  for  seasonal  price 
setting, we suppose the same is  true in  that case as well:  the  probability of price 
adjustment conditional on the previous adjustment taking place at the beginning of the 
year (or quarter) would be lower than the unconditional probability of adjustment. 
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Therefore, we adopt the same approach in the regressions explaining the incidence of 
seasonal price setting using, as explanatory variables, both the conditional frequency 
of price changes if the last price change was at the beginning of a year/quarter and the 
conditional frequency if it was within a year/quarter.  
 
3.4. Result for Time-Regular Adjustment. 
We first discuss the results for time-regular policies. We implement the model 
by looking at the determinants of the excess proportion of price changes taking place 
at the beginning of a year and, separately, at the beginning of a quarter. We call such 
adjustments  seasonal.  Empirically, price changes  in the Austrian  data are,  indeed, 
more  frequent  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  and,  for  some  products,  also  at  the 
beginning of a quarter (see Baumgartner et al., 2005). 
We estimate the following equation:  
 
( ) , ,
seas nseas
i i i i Seas f F F z =
￿
        (8) 
 
where  i indexes markets (product categories), Seasi is the excess proportion of price 
changes at the beginning of a period (a year or a quarter), defined below, 
seas
i F is the 
average  frequency  of  price  changes  in  market  i  conditional  on  the  previous  price 
change  having  taken  place  at  the  beginning  of  a  period, 
nseas
i F is  the  average 
frequency conditional on the previous price change having taken place within a period 
and  i z
￿
 is a vector of control variables. 
  According to Proposition 3, firms which have a flatter profit function at  ˆ* t  
will change their  prices less frequently, by  a larger amount and  prefer a  seasonal 
pattern of their price adjustment, i.e. have a larger proportion of price changes at the 
beginning of a year or a quarter. Thus under H0 (i.e. when firms differ in terms of the 
concavity of the profit function), the share of price changes at the beginning of a 
period should be negatively related to the (conditional) frequency of price changes 
and positively related to the average size of adjustment. Under H1 (i.e. when firms 
differ in terms of menu costs) the share of price changes at the beginning of period 
should  be  positively  related  to  the  (conditional)  frequency  of  price  changes  and 
negatively related to the average size of adjustment.  
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The dependent variable in regression (8) is the ratio of the number of price 
changes taking place at the beginning of the period to the number of all price changes 
in that period, normalized to avoid it being bounded. Given that our data are monthly 
we adopt two definitions of a period: a year and a quarter. In yearly regressions we 
compute the ratio of the number of price changes in a January of any year to all price 
changes in the sample; in quarterly regressions we compute the ratio of the number of 
price changes in any January, April, July or September to the number of all changes in 
the sample. The (normalized) dependent variable is obtained by dividing the yearly 
(quarterly) statistics by the share of valid price observations at the beginning of the 
year (quarter). According to this definition, a number above 1 indicates that relatively 
more prices are changed at the beginning of the period than average.  
 
The remaining control variables include the size of price changes, the average 
and the standard deviation of inflation for the product i, the degree of synchronization 
of price changes, the share of sales prices and dummies for broad good categories. 
Under  H0  large  price  changes  characterize  firms  with  flat  profit  functions 
which, by Proposition 4(a), prefer seasonal adjustment while, under H1, large price 
changes characterize firms with high adjustment costs which, by Proposition 4(b), 
rarely  adjust  at  the  beginning  of  the  period.  Hence  we  expect  the  coefficient  on 
adjustment size to be positive under H0 and negative under H1.  
The  average  inflation  rate  may  matter  since,  ceteris  paribus,  the  higher  is 
inflation the more frequent and larger are price changes and the steeper is the profit 
function at  ˆ* t . But the effect of inflation is indirect, operating through its impact on 
adjustment size (and frequency). Since we are controlling for the size of price changes 
in the regression, the coefficient on the average inflation rate represents the effect on 
seasonal adjustment holding constant the size of price changes. The model makes no 
predictions about this conditional effect. Another consideration, not addressed directly 
by our model, is the flexibility of optimal policy. Seasonal adjustment lowers the cost 
of adjustment but reduces the firm’s pricing flexibility. Presumably, the higher is the 
inflation rate, the more important is flexibility and so we expect the coefficient to be 
negative.  For  the  same reason we  expect a negative effect of inflation variability, 
measured by the standard deviation of the monthly inflation rate for the product i. The 
32
ECB
Working Paper Series No 669
August 2006 
benefit of flexibility for state-contingent adjustment increases with the variability of 
the environment. 
  An important issue in analyzing the seasonal pattern of adjustment is that, in 
some industries, firms tend to change prices together. For example, clothing stores 
hold  simultaneous  sales.  This  tendency  to  synchronize  price  changes  needs  to  be 
controlled for so as to avoid spurious correlation between seasonal patterns and the 
conditional frequencies of adjustment. Therefore we include, on the right hand side of 
the regression, the synchronization index of price changes as defined by Fisher and 
Konieczny (2000). It summarizes, with a single number, the tendency of prices to be 
changed together. The index is defined as the ratio of the sample standard deviation of 
the monthly proportion of price changes for a given product category to the standard 
deviation  of  the  proportion  under  the  assumption  that  price  changes  are  perfectly 
synchronized. 
The share of sales prices is included in the regression to control for situations 
where, in some markets, a large proportion of price changes are seasonal just because 
sales are held in January or at the beginning of a quarter. Similarly, some markets may 
be characterized by a low proportion of seasonal adjustment if sales are held within 
quarters.
24 
Finally, we add dummy variables for broad good categories: processed food, 
energy,  industrial  goods  and  services  (the  reference  category  omitted  in  the 
regressions is unprocessed food) to account for fixed effects related to broad good 
categories.  The  probability  of  price  changes  differs  significantly  across  these 
categories, and the differences are remarkably consistent across countries. In the eight 
comprehensive  data  sets  (for  Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Luxemburg, 
Portugal,  Spain  and  the  U.S.)
25  as  well  as  in  the  four  smaller  sets  (for  Poland, 
Germany, Holland and Italy)
26 the probability of price change is always the lowest for 
services,  the  highest  for  energy  (except  for  Portugal,  where  prices  of  energy  are 
                                                 
24 Sales prices are identified by an indicator in the data set if a price is subject to a temporary promotion 
or a sale. In addition to these “flagged“ sales, we identify “unflagged” sales as price reductions which 
are fully reversed in the following period. About 4% of all price observations in our data set are flagged 
sales prices and 1% are unflagged sales according to the above definition; for more information see 
Baumgartner et al., 2005.  
25 Baumgartner et al. (2005), Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004), Vilmunen and Laakkonen (2004), 
Baudry et al. (2004), Lünnemann and Mathä (2005), Dias et al. (2004) Álvarez and Hernando (2005) 
and Bils and Klenow (2004), respectively. 
26 Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2006), Hoffmann and Kurz-Kim (2004), Jonker et al. (2004) and 
Veronese et al. (2005), respectively. 
33
ECB
Working Paper Series No 669
August 2006 
regulated  and  change  relatively  infrequently)  and  unprocessed  food,  followed  by 
processed food and industrial goods.  
The results of regression (8) are in Table 2. 
   
Table 2. 
Explaining the share of price changes at the beginning of a period (year, quarter) 
 
Variable
Constant 0.591 *** 0.904 ***
Frequency conditional on seas. (Fi
seas) -2.926 *** -1.771 ***
Frequency conditional on not seas. (Fi
nseas) -0.650 1.367 ***
Size of price changes 1.635 1.020 ***
Average inflation 0.592 *** 0.023
Standard deviation of inflation -0.039 -0.007
Synchronization of price changes index 5.643 *** 0.676 ***
Share of sales prices -1.371 -0.741 *
Processed food dummy -0.117 0.011
Energy dummy -0.293 0.102
Industrial goods dummy -0.116 0.062 ***
Services dummy 0.552 *** 0.038
Number of observations 491 480
Adjusted R
2 0.458 0.221
Period = Year Period = Quarter
 
Notes:  Estimation  method  is  OLS;  standard  errors  are  computed  using  White’s  correction  for 
heteroskedasticity; inflation is calculated as monthly changes in the corresponding product category’s 
sub-index; the number of products included is lower than the maximum 517 because some variables are 
not defined for all products; *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% level.  
 
Table 2 shows the results for the period defined as a year (column 1) and the 
period defined as a quarter (column 2). Of the two specifications, price setting at the 
beginning of a year is empirically more relevant (the mean of the dependent variable 
is 2.01, indicating that price changes in January are 101% more frequent than in the 
other months of the year) than price adjustment at the beginning of a quarter (with a 
mean dependent variable of 1.16). Therefore, we regard the first column in the table 
as our standard specification and treat the results for price setting at the beginning of a 
quarter as an additional specification for a robustness check.  
The crucial result is that the sign on both conditional frequencies: 
seas
i F  (i.e. if 
the last price change has taken place at the beginning of a year) and 
nseas
i F  (if the last 
price change has taken place within a year) is negative, as implied under H0. The 
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i F  is significant at the 1% level. In other words, in markets where 
prices are changed  infrequently, a large proportion of these changes  take place in 
January. The coefficient is both statistically and economically significant: increasing 
the conditional frequency if the last price change was at the beginning of the year 
seas
i F   by  one  standard  deviation  (17.3  percentage  points)  reduces  the  excess 
proportion of seasonal price adjustment by 0.29 standard deviations (0.51 in absolute 
terms). Note that in the regression we control for the synchronization of price setting 
(which  is  positive  and  significant)  as  well  as  for  sales  (which  turn  out  not  to  be 
significant). While the Fisher-Konieczny index is not a perfect control
27, this reduces 
the likelihood that the negative sign is due to some markets being characterized by 
yearly price changes in January only, or by sales in January.  
The coefficient on the size of price changes has a positive sign, as implied 
under  H0  but  the  effect  is  only  marginally  significant  (at  the  11%  level).  The 
coefficient on average inflation is positive; that on inflation volatility is, as expected, 
negative, but it is not significant.  
Only  services  show  a  significantly  higher  share  of  price  changes  at  the 
beginning of the year than the reference group (unprocessed food), which is related to 
the fact that many service prices in Austria are regularly changed in January (see 
Baumgartner  et  al.,  2005).  The  commercial  practice  of  sales  and  temporary 
promotions  is  obviously  not  an  important  determinant  of seasonal  price  setting  in 
January: the coefficient on the sales variable is negative but not significant. Finally, 
the coefficient on the synchronization variable is positive and significant at the 1% 
level.  This  indicates  that  in  markets  where  firms  synchronize  price  changes, 
adjustment in January is frequent. 
The regression results for the quarterly pattern of adjustment, shown in the 
second  column  of  Table  2,  are  similar  to  those  in  the  first  column  with  a  few 
exceptions. The coefficient on 
nseas
i F  is positive and significant and the group effects 
are somewhat different. The coefficient on the size of price changes is positive, as 
expected under H0, and significant. As time-regular pricing is less pronounced than in 
yearly data it is not surprising that the adjusted R
2 is much lower than in the yearly 
regression. We conclude that the results for both regressions provide the same picture. 
                                                 
27 It leaves several degrees of freedom as it summarizes, with just a single number, the monthly pattern 
in the proportion of price changes. 
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3.5. Results for State-Regular Adjustment. 
  We now turn to state-regular adjustment, i.e. adjustment under which the price 
charged is an attractive price. The empirical implementation of the testing requires a 
definition of attractive prices. There is no universal approach to defining attractive 
prices. We chose to adopt a broad definition that tries to capture all prices which are 
used by any firm or retailer as attractive prices. This comes at the risk of classifying 
too many prices as attractive. We think this is less problematic than missing important 
attractive  prices.  We  require  that  the  (percentage)  differences  between  attractive 
prices be not affected by the order of magnitude of the prices (i.e. if 15.90 is an 
attractive  price,  so  is  159  and  1590).  This  is  important  in  our  data  set  as  it 
encompasses  the  replacement  of  the  Schilling  with  the  Euro,  which  involved  the 
reduction of prices by roughly an order of magnitude (the exchange rate was 13.7603 
Schillings/Euro).  In  addition,  our  definition  is  specifically  tailored  to the  Austrian 
retail market as it takes account of the common pricing practices observed there (e.g. 
prices ending in 75 are not used as attractive prices in Austria). An explanation of the 
principles of our definition and (an excerpt of) a list of attractive prices are in the 
Appendix. With our definition, the average proportion of attractive prices in the data 
is 60.7%. It ranges from 0.07 for car insurance to 0.92 for digital cameras. 
The estimated equation is: 
( ) , ,
att natt
i i i i Attr f F F z =
￿
        (9) 
  Under  H0  (i.e.  when  firms  differ  in  terms  of  the  concavity  of  the  profit 
function),  the  share  of  attractive  prices  should  be  negatively  related  to  the 
(conditional) frequency of price changes and positively related to the average size of 
adjustment. Under H1 (i.e. when firms differ in terms of menu costs) the share of 
attractive prices should be positively related to the (conditional) frequency of price 
changes and negatively related to the average size of adjustment.  
The  share  of  attractive  prices  is  a  fractional  response  variable  (bounded 
between 0 and 1), which implies that estimating a linear model is not appropriate. 
Therefore  we  transform  the  dependent  variable  to  the  log-odds  ratio, 
( ) ln /(1 ) i i Attr Attr -   which  is  not  bounded,  and  run  an  OLS  regression  on  the 
transformed variable.
 28 In order to obtain the marginal effect of each variable on the 
                                                 
28 The log-odds model has been criticized for delivering marginal effects that may be inconsistent. An 
alternative approach used in Dhyne et al. (2005) is the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) approach 
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dependent variable, the regression coefficients,  k b , have to be converted back by the 
formula 
____ ____
/ 1 k dy dx Attr Attr b
￿ ￿
= - ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
 which usually is evaluated at the sample mean.  
  The control variables include the size of price changes, the average price level, 
the rate of inflation and its variability (measured by its standard deviation) and the 
share  of  sales  prices.  As  before,  the  coefficient  on  the  size  of  price  changes  is 
expected to be positive under H0 and negative under H1. If attractive prices are more 
relevant at lower price levels (i.e. for cheaper goods), the average absolute price in a 
product category should be related negatively to the share of attractive prices. This 
variable also serves as a check if our definition of attractive prices is reasonable. For 
the reasons related to the flexibility of the optimal policy, outlined in the previous 
subsection, we expect the coefficients on the average product-specific inflation and on 
its variability to be negative. Finally, the incidence of attractive prices may be affected 
by temporary promotions and end-of-season sales; casual observation suggests that 
these  prices  are  often  attractive,  and  so  we  include  the  share  of  sales  prices  and 
promotions in each product category as another control variable in the regressions.  
The  results  of  regression  (9)  are  in  Table  3.  We  estimate  the  regression 
separately for the whole sample, and for the period prior to the introduction of the 
Euro. 
The  results  are  similar  to  those  for  the  case  of  seasonal  adjustment.  The 
frequency  of  price  changes  (conditional  on  the  last  price  being  an  attractive 
price,
att
i F ) has a negative impact on the share of attractive prices, as implied under 
H0.  This  effect  is  significant  at  the  10%  level  for  the  whole  sample,  but  is  not 
significant  for  the  short  sample.  The  coefficient  is  economically  significant:  the 
marginal effect implies that, if the conditional frequency increases by one standard 
deviation (13.7 percentage points), the share of attractive prices is decreased by 0.44 
standard deviations (10.2 percentage points).  
 
                                                                                                                                         
proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). It involves directly estimating a non-linear model of the 
explanatory variables and maximizing its likelihood function based on a Bernoulli distribution. We also 
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Table 3. 
Explaining the share of attractive prices. 
 
Variable
Constant 0.231 *** 0.371 ***
Frequency conditional on attr (Fi
att) -0.745 * -0.130
Frequency conditional on not attr (Fi
natt) 0.649 * -0.189
Size of price changes 0.622 *** 0.552 **
Average price (Schilling period) 0.000 0.000
Average price (Euro period) 0.000
Average inflation -0.102 ** -0.132 ***
Standard deviation of inflation 0.001 0.006
Share of sales prices 0.830 ** 0.919 **
Processed food dummy 0.008 0.023
Energy dummy -0.528 *** -0.611 ***
Industrial goods dummy -0.284 *** -0.360 ***
Services dummy -0.315 *** -0.315 ***
Number of observations 505 507
Adjusted R
2 0.417 0.356






Notes: Estimation method is OLS on the log-odds ratio of the share of attractive prices; displayed 
coefficients are marginal effects of each variable on the share of attractive prices evaluated at the 
sample mean; standard errors are computed using White’s correction for heteroskedasticity; inflation is 
calculated  as  monthly  changes  of  the  corresponding  product  category’s  sub-index;  the  number  of 
products included is lower than  the  maximum 517 because  some  variables are  not  defined for all 
products; *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% level.  
 
The effect of the frequency conditional on the last price not being attractive 
(
natt
i F ),  however,  is  positive  and  significant  in  the  long  sample.  A  possible 
explanation of this result is that firms have a strong incentive to follow an attractive 
pricing policy. For some reason they sometimes deviate from that policy and choose a 
price that is not attractive. But if they do so, they quickly return to an attractive price 
afterwards, which increases the conditional probability of a price change when the last 
price is not attractive.
29  
The average (absolute) size of price changes in a market has a positive impact 
on the share of attractive prices in this market, as predicted implied under H0. The 
average price in the product category, which has been calculated separately for the 
                                                 
29 That may be the case if the benefit from charging an attractive price is not lump sum, as modeled 
here, but is a stream of benefits. This is the implication of the rational inattention explanation of 
attractive prices by Basu (1997) and Bergen et al (2003). We leave such extension for future research. 
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Schilling period (1996-2001) and for the Euro period (2001-2003), does not affect the 
incidence of attractive prices. This result is reassuring as it indicates that the definition 
of attractive prices has been chosen appropriately. The average (monthly) inflation 
rate  has  a  significant  negative  impact  on  the  share  of  attractive  prices  while  the 
volatility of inflation is not significant. Finally, the practice of sales and temporary 
promotions turns out to be an important additional determinant of attractive prices: the 
product categories with a higher share of sales and promotions are characterized by a 
higher share of attractive prices and the share of attractive prices is significantly lower 
for non-food items.  
To check whether attractive price setting was not systematically different for 
Schilling and for Euro prices, in column 2 we show the regression results obtained for 
the sample period covered by our dataset when the Schilling was the legal tender in 
Austria  (1996-2001).
30  Overall,  the  results  for  the  short  sample  are  qualitatively 
similar to the long sample. The exception is that the frequency of a price change, 
conditional on the last price not being attractive price has a negative sign and neither 
conditional frequency is significant.  
To sum up, the regression results for both the time-regular adjustment and 
state-regular adjustment support H0: the joint hypothesis that adjustment costs vary as 
postulated  and  heterogeneity  across  markets  is  due  to  differences  in  terms  of  the 
concavity of the profit function, as suggested by Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2006). 
The results reject the joint hypothesis that adjustment costs vary as postulated and 
heterogeneity  across  markets  is  due  to  differences  in  the  value  of  menu  costs,  as 
assumed by Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999).  
 
IV. Conclusions and Extensions 
  Regular adjustment is ubiquitous in many environments, yet the reasons for 
such behaviour have not received much attention. In this paper we make a small step 
towards  explaining  the  incidence  of  regular  adjustment.  It  is  attributed  to  the 
heterogeneity in adjustment costs across time/states and the heterogeneity in the shape 
of the benefit function across policymakers. The results show that our assumption on 
                                                 
30 The sample period form the introduction of the Euro to the end of our sample (2002-2003) is too 
short to be analysed separately. 
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adjustment heterogeneity, despite its remarkable simplicity, is sufficient to account for 
the observed pricing behaviour. 
  Understanding  the  motives  for  regular  adjustments  is  important  for  both 
theoretical and practical reasons. In the Fisher-Taylor and Calvo frameworks, and the 
vast  macroeconomic  literature  based  on  them,  time-regular  adjustment  is  simply 
assumed. Models are developed and calibrated on the assumption that pricing policies 
are time contingent or, at best, that both time and state contingent policies are present 
but the division of price setters between the two types is fixed. While convenient, this 
assumption is unsatisfactory when macroeconomic conditions change. As an example, 
consider  the  empirical  findings  of  Gagnon  (2006)  who  studies  pricing  policies  in 
Mexico. His data are unique in that they cover a wide range of inflation rates. He 
finds  that  changes  in  the  inflation  rate  do  not  affect  adjustment  frequency  when 
inflation is low, but do when inflation rate is high. This is consistent with implications 
of our model: under H0 the lower is the inflation rate, the higher is the incidence of 
regular policies. 
  Ignoring  the  fact  that  the  incidence  of  regular  policies  is  an  endogenous 
variable may lead to erroneous predictions. For example the effect of low inflation on 
the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the source of the stability. If the 
reason  why  inflation  has  been  low  and  stable  in  recent  years  is  mostly  due  to 
monetary policy, then we can expect greater incidence of regular adjustments and 
increased monetary effectiveness. On the other hand, assume inflation is low because 
of  greater  competition.  This  raises  demand  elasticity  and,  so,  by  increasing  the 
concavity of the profit functions, lowers the incidence of regular price adjustments 
and reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
  In future work we plan to consider stochastic inflation. We expect the results 
would  not  change  much  as  the  optimal,  state-contingent  pricing  policy  under 
stochastic inflation is similar to the policy under a constant inflation rate. The analysis 
of stochastic inflation should bring out the benefits of flexibility. Policymakers who 
adopt regular adjustment reduce their flexibility. The understanding of the costs and 
benefits of flexibility is not only of intrinsic importance to these policymakers but is 
also important for more general considerations. Monetary policy is more effective 
when nominal price adjustments are regular. 
  One way of viewing state-contingent (as opposed to regular) adjustment is that 
it provides the option of flexibility, at the cost of raising adjustment costs. Assume 
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that there is a setup cost of switching to regular adjustment, for example the expense 
on the organization of work flow. Consider a situation of high monetary stability, 
followed by  a period of  lower monetary stability.  Since  the  value of  flexibility is 
lower in a stable environment, firms pay the setup cost and adopt regular adjustment. 
When the economy becomes less stable firms may not abandon regular adjustment 
since the setup cost has been paid. Therefore, even though the increased monetary 
stability is temporary, it permanently reduces flexibility of pricing policies at the firm 
level. Since monetary policy is more effective when firm follows regular adjustment, 
the result is a history-dependent slope of the Phillips curve.  
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Definition of attractive prices 
 
Attractive prices are defined for price ranges in order to take account of different 
attractive prices at different price levels: from 0 to 10 Austrian Schillings (ATS) all 
prices ending at x.00, x.50 and x.90 ATS, from 10 to 100 ATS all prices ending at 
xx0.00,  xx5.00  and  xx.90  ATS,  from  100  to  1,000  ATS  prices ending  at  xx0.00, 
xx5.00 and xx9.00 and xxx.90 ATS and so on. An equivalent rule has been defined to 
identify attractive prices in Euro after the cash changeover (2002-2003). Table A1 
shows an excerpt of a list of attractive prices for the Schilling case. In order to give a 
complete list of  attractive prices, the table would  continue to the right and  to  the 
bottom. The extension to the right would show multiples of 10 and 100 of the last four 
columns.  
 
Table A1: Attractive prices for the Schilling period (1996-2001) 
below 1  1-9.99
105.00 1050.00
0.50 1.00 10.00 10.90 100.00 109.00 100.90 1000.00 1090.00 1009.00 1009.90
115.00 101.90 1150.00 1019.00 1019.90
0.90 11.90 110.00 119.00 102.90 1100.00 1190.00 1029.00 1029.90
125.00 103.90 1250.00 1039.00 1039.90
12.90 120.00 129.00 104.90 1200.00 1290.00 1049.00 1049.90
135.00 105.90 1350.00 1059.00 1059.90
13.90 130.00 139.00 106.90 1300.00 1390.00 1069.00 1069.90
145.00 107.90 1450.00 1079.00 1079.90
14.90 140.00 149.00 108.90 1400.00 1490.00 1089.00 1089.90
155.00 109.90 1550.00 1099.00 1099.90
1.50 15.00 15.90 150.00 159.00 110.90 1500.00 1590.00 1109.00 1109.90
165.00 111.90 1650.00 1119.00 1119.90
16.90 160.00 169.00 112.90 1600.00 1690.00 1129.00 1129.90
175.00 113.90 1750.00 1139.00 1139.90
17.90 170.00 179.00 114.90 1700.00 1790.00 1149.00 1149.90
185.00 115.90 1850.00 1159.00 1159.90
18.90 180.00 189.00 116.90 1800.00 1890.00 1169.00 1169.90
195.00 117.90 1950.00 1179.00 1179.90
1.90 19.00 19.90 190.00 199.00 118.90 1900.00 1990.00 1189.00 1189.90
205.00 119.90 2050.00 1199.00 1199.90
2.00 20.00 20.90 200.00 209.00 120.90 2000.00 2090.00 1209.00 1209.90
215.00 121.90 2150.00 1219.00 1219.90
21.90 210.00 219.00 122.90 2100.00 2190.00 1229.00 1229.90
225.00 123.90 2250.00 1239.00 1239.90
22.90 220.00 229.00 124.90 2200.00 2290.00 1249.00 1249.90
235.00 125.90 2350.00 1259.00 1259.90
23.90 230.00 239.00 126.90 2300.00 2390.00 1269.00 1269.90
245.00 127.90 2450.00 1279.00 1279.90
24.90 240.00 249.00 128.90 2400.00 2490.00 1289.00 1289.90
255.00 129.90 2550.00 1299.00 1299.90
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